NTS Exit Reform: Exit Charging Consultation Proposals

Gas TCMF

1st February 2007



Background

- Pricing Discussions
 - GCD 01 NTS Exit (Flat) Capacity
 - NTS Exit (Flat) Capacity
 - Prevailing prices and annual and daily reserve prices
 - GCD 02- NTS Exit (Flexibility) Capacity and Commodity
 - Reserve prices for annual and daily auctions
 - New SO Flexibility Commodity Charge Rate
 - Revised SO Commodity Charge Rate
 - GCD 03 TO Under/over-recovery mechanisms
- Need to consult soon if we are to publish charges 2 months ahead of the proposed July application period/auction.
- Need to make assumptions regarding
 - Mod 0116V and alternates outcome expected March 2007
 - Charging Proposal GCM 01 –25th April 2007 at the latest

Content

- Proposals
 - Flat Exit Capacity
 - NTS TO Exit (Flat) Capacity
 - Flex Exit Capacity
 - NTS TO Exit (Flex) Capacity
 - SO Cost Recovery
 - NTS SO Exit (Flex) Commodity Charge
 - NTS SO Exit (Flat) Commodity Charge
 - TO Over/Under Recovery
 - NTS TO Exit (Flat) Commodity
- Way Forward

Flat Exit Capacity



Flat Exit Capacity

"Prevailing NTS Exit (Flat) Capacity"

 Users will be able to apply for such rights in July of Gas Year Y for Gas Year Y+4 onwards;

"Annual NTS Exit (Flat) Capacity"

 Users will be able to bid for such rights in August of Gas Year Y for Gas Years Y+1, Y+2 and Y+3 via annual auctions;

"Daily NTS Exit (Flat) Capacity"

 Users will be able to bid for such rights ahead of and during the Gas Day via daily auctions; and

"Daily Interruptible NTS Exit (Flat) Capacity"

 Interruptible NTS Exit (Flat) Capacity. Users will be able to bid for such rights ahead of the Gas Day via daily auctions.



NTS TO Exit (Flat) Capacity Price Proposals

- Based on prevailing methodology (i.e. with GCM01 approved or rejected), except for
 - Nodal as opposed to zonal prices for NTS/LDZ offtakes
 - Interruption Payments Removed
- Applicable for
 - "Prevailing NTS Exit (Flat) Capacity" Price
 - "Annual NTS Exit (Flat) Capacity" Reserve Price
 - "Daily NTS Exit (Flat) Capacity" Reserve Price
 - Exception "Daily Interruptible NTS Exit (Flat) Capacity"
 - Zero Reserve Price



NTS TO Exit (Flat) Capacity Price Proposals – dependency on GCM01

- GCM01 Approved
 - Transportation Model
 - Prices <u>adjusted</u> to collect forecast allowed revenue
 - Proposed input data changes
 - Network & Supply/demand input data based on year for which capacity is being released
 - Investment costs from 3 years prior to capacity release

- GCM01 Rejected
 - Transcost
 - Prices <u>scaled</u> to collect forecast allowed revenue
 - No input data changes proposed
 - Network & Supply/demand input data based on current year
 - Investment costs from current year



Flex Exit Capacity



NTS TO Exit (Flex) Capacity Price Proposals

- Zero Flex Capacity Reserve Price
- No Target Revenue associated with Flex
- All Flex Capacity Revenue treated as over recovery and re-cycled through negative TO Exit (Flat) Commodity Charge



SO Revenue Recovery



SO Cost Recovery Proposals

- NTS SO Exit (Flex) Commodity
 - Defer any proposal as implementation not required until 2010
 - Raise proposal subject to further monitoring of usage and costs indicating material change in behaviour/cost

- NTS SO Exit (Flat) Commodity
 - Map to NTS SO Exit Commodity for non-storage sites
 - Map to NTS SO Storage Commodity charge for storage sites
 - National Grid NTS View:
 - May not be an immediate requirement for a proposal
 - Consider as part of wider review of commodity charges



Risks & Benefits of introducing a non-zero Flex Commodity Charge

Benefit

- Incentivise appropriate usage of NTS Flexibility
 - Should create a daily incentive for a DN to maximise the use of its own stock before using NTS FF capacity

Risks

- Adds additional complexity & cost
 - Small quantity of revenue collected through the charge (5% of SO allowed revenue)
 - Hourly data issues
 - Users might need to check the billable quantity on a daily basis
 - Lack of User support
- Charge might only be effective in influencing DNO behaviour if DNs are exposed to the cost through the incentive arrangements
 - Structure of DN incentives may mean that DNs are incentivised to minimise their use of NTS flexibility without a flex commodity charge.



TO Under/Over Recovery



TO Over/Under Recovery

- NTS TO (Flat) Commodity Charge
 - Sole revenue recovery correction mechanism
 - The absence of a buy-back incentive scheme means that any buy-back offset mechanism would be redundant
 - Calculated to ensure that 50% of TO Allowed Revenue (less revenue collected from DN Pensions charge) is recovered from NTS Exit Charges
 - Capped to ensure net commodity charge is non-negative
 - Applicable to all Exit Points
- National Grid NTS View:
 - No immediate requirement for a proposal
 - Consider as part of wider review of commodity charges



Way Forward

Exit Reform Charging Timeline

Milestone	Date
Raise Proposals (Latest Date) 19th February 200	
Consultation Ends 19 th March 2007	
Decision on UNC Modification Proposal 0116 March 2007	
Consultation Conclusions inc. Final Proposals* 2 nd April 2007	
Ofgem veto period expires (Assumes no Impact Assessment) 30 th April 2007	
Notice of Prices	30 th April 2007
Application/Auction	July 2007

^{*} NB Final proposals may need to take into account Ofgem's decisions on UNC Mod 0116 and GCM01

Proposed Exit Reform Charging Way Forward

Issue	Proposal	Way Forward
Flat Exit Capacity	Raise February '07	Prevailing Methodology with minor variations & Removal of Interruption Payments
Flex Exit Capacity		Zero Reserve Price - Recycle all revenue through negative TO Commodity charge
SO Cost Recovery	No proposal at this stage. Consider as part of wider commodity review*	No Change to Flat SO Commodity No Flex SO Commodity Proposal at this stage (effectively zero rate)
TO Over/Under Recovery		TO commodity charge may not be required and would only be applicable from 2010

^{*} Views sought from the Gas TCMF